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Abstract: Policy-making and enforcement remains centralized in Vietnam. Policies have been
formulated with less scientific and public justification, thus being largely bureaucratic and infeasible,
and in many cases, they have created plagues for people at the grass-roots levels. This article focuses
on the implementation of policies related to intertidal land-use and supports for clam farming in the
Thaibinh province as a case study to explore the impacts of policies on clam farming and farmers.
During the period of 2011–2013, provincial policies on intertidal land allocation and technical and
financial supports had boosted clam farming development in the province to a surprising extent.
Rapid expansion of the clam farming area has created significant consequences for the farming
sector, as well as farmer’s lives. However, for the same provincial policies, but with different
enforcement, different farming outcomes for clam farmers in the three study communes have resulted.
Where farmers had more of a voice and choice in bidding for the intertidal areas they preferred,
they faced fewer problems. It is, thus, suggested that a more decentralized policy-making and
enforcement are needed, in which more scientific assessment and farmer participation are required
to not only make government policy more successful in supporting farmers and achieving their
expected outcomes, but also to provide farmers with more room to make their own farming decisions
from which farming and marketing risks could be mitigated.
Keywords: land-use policy; aquaculture; clam farming; North coastal Vietnam
1. Introduction
The annual average growth rate of aquaculture in Vietnam has remained at over 17% since 2000.
For 2015 alone, agriculture created an export value of $6.7 trillion [1]. Aquaculture has helped reduce
the incidence of poverty by 4.3% and decreased the poverty gap and poverty severity indices [2].
Given the economic return and rural labor absorption of the sector, the Vietnamese government
has paid greater attention and has made investments to boost development of the sector through
extensive and intensive practices. Under government policies, the local livelihood system which was
traditionally dominated by food crops in coastal areas has been significantly restructured since the
2000s, with increased area being allocated for aquacultural production [3].
Thaibinh is located in the Red River Delta of Vietnam. The province is endowed with the largest
intertidal area for clam farming among coastal provinces in Northern Vietnam [4]. In the early 1990s,
increased market demand for clams and the reduction in natural clam resources initiated a demand
for clam farming in the province, initially with a small area of about 150 ha. The clam production
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area was gradually expanded in the following years and reached roughly 1019 ha in 2006. In 2011,
the provincial government officially institutionalized clam farming, aiming at boosting the sector by
zoning and bidding intertidal areas to farmers. Together, loans were made available for farmers to
invest in clam farming. Clam farming areas had been quickly expanded to roughly 3500 ha in 2013.
In 2014, the clam farming area retreated slightly, given the chaos in clam farming productivity in 2011
and the reduced clam market demand faced by farmers in 2012 (see Figures 1 and 2 [5]).
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Figure 1. Clam production area and yield (2006–2014).
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The increased clam farming density r s lted in a sharp increase in clam yield, especially in
2009 and 2010. However, increased natural and artificial disasters, coupled with the low quality of
clam breeds, resulted in a sharp reduction of clam yield in 2011 and 2012. Since then, clam yield
has fluctuated a oun 18 ons/ha. The clam m rk t price was on the rise from 2006–2009. In this
period, clams were considered s a “golden” farming opportunity in Thaibinh, as well as in th wh le
country. However, shortly after enjoying such a golden period, farmers were faced with a re uc
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clam market price in the following years. A sharp decline in the clam market price had happened from
2011 to 2014 (Figure 2).
The large fluctuation of clam yield and market price reflects the fact that clam farming is subjected
to different risks in farming practices and the market. The clam farming cycle, which is different from
other aquacultural animals, such as shrimp, crabs, and fish, is relatively longer, i.e., two to three years.
A longer farming cycle, mostly dependent on natural resources, i.e., nutrition for clams, intertidal
conditions, and wastewater discharged from inlands, has made clam farming more vulnerable to risks,
both natural and artificial. The probability of loss in clam farming in a growing season was estimated at
52% for the period of 2006–2014 (Calculated by Monte Carlo simulation using the Crystal Ball software
(Oracle Co.: Redwood City, CA, USA) for clam production data collected from the household survey).
Government policy should be considered as a resource manager that plays a significant role
in managing and protecting natural resources. To support farmers in the management of natural
resources and risk mitigation, governments of many countries have developed a number of policies and
regulations related to agriculture in general, and to aquaculture in particular [6]. However, in reality,
many government policies have not been able to achieve their expected outcomes in supporting
farmers to cope with farming risks. For example, agricultural protection policies that the Japanese
government issued and implemented for post-war reconstruction forced the domestic price to exceed
the international market price by 40% in the 1950s, and even by 120% in the 1990s, which harmed
Japanese farmers in the following years [7]. Another example is a disaster assistance program created
by the USA government that was criticized due to its high costs and the producer’s benefit being offset
by lower market revenues [8].
When launching an intervention policy, governments often consider at least three criteria, such as:
(1) fiscal constraint; (2) social relief for serious catastrophes; and (3) market orientation [9]. However,
government policy addressing certain risks could cause other risks to emerge. For instance, an increase
in output volume by addressing farming risks could cause market risks because of product oversupply.
Agricultural risks are thus interrelated and interdependent between, and among, market, government
actions, and farmers’ farming and marketing strategies [10].
Focusing on the case study of clam farming and marketing practices in the Thaibinh coastal area,
this study aims to explore possible impacts of government policy and success (and failure) of farmers in
their clam farming and marketing practices. This paper aims to answer two major questions: (1) What
were the government policies/interventions regarding land-use in clam farming in the Thaibinh
province? (2) What lessons can be learned from the enforcement of these policies/interventions in
local conditions?
2. Research Methodology
2.1. Study Site
Thaibinh remains an agriculture-based province, located in the “rice bowl” of the Red River
Delta of Vietnam. Sixty-six percent of the provincial workforce is devoted to the agricultural sector.
Even though much change in the provincial GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product) structure has
happened toward more industrial and service sector contributions over the last 30 years under
the market-based economic policy of Vietnam, agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture still show
a contribution of 25%–35% of the total provincial value of production in recent years. Most farmers
have been traditionally living on food crop production and animal raising. About 26% of farmers living
along coastal areas seek their livelihood from coastal aquacultural activities, mostly in combination
with other traditional livelihood activities. In 2015, the total value of GRDP of Thaibinh was estimated
at $1.956 trillion and GRDP per capita was about $1377. In which, total aquaculture production
generated a value of $174 million [11].
Among coastal provinces in the north of Vietnam, Thaibinh has the largest clam farming areas
(i.e., 3430 ha), followed by Namdinh (1710 ha), Thanhhoa (1200 ha), and Quangninh (1000 ha)
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(in 2013) [12]. According to the Thaibinh Agriculture and Fishery Extension Center, salinity in the
intertidal area is around 1.5%–2.5%, favouring aquaculture development. The total area that has the
potential for aquaculture is around 17,000 ha [12], of which 15,119 ha (or roughly 89% of the total
potential area) have been brought into aquaculture production with many type of species, such as
shrimp, fish, and clam. In 2014, the total clam production generated a value of VND 445 billion
(about 20 million USD, exchange rate: $1 USD = $22,000 VND) for Thaibinh province (Figure 2).
There are 12 communes of the province involved in clam farming. These are located along 50 km
of coastline in the province. For the study, three communes were selected. These have the largest clam
farming area as well as the longest history of clam production in the province. These characteristics
allow researchers to capture the risks and farmer’s resilience/capacity in clam farming over a relatively
long period of time, i.e., from 2006 to 2014. There are 1310 households doing clam farming in the
three communes at the time of the study (see Figure 3 [13,14]).
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2.2. Data Collection
Fieldwork was carried out in the study site from Augus 2014 to April 2015. Secondary data
regarding policies on intertidal land planning, and allocation, financial and technical supports for
clam production was gathered from different local government offices and published papers/reports.
Primary data was collected by using different research tools. Data on clam farming and marketing
practices and risks, and farmer’s capacity and strategies to recover from different risks that occurred
between 2006 and 2014, was collected. Data was then combined to identify impacts of policies on clam
farming practices, consequent risks and farmers coping strategies. The three research tools used for
field research were:
2.2.1. Key Informants’ Interviews (KIs)
Eleven key persons from local governments at thre dministr tive levels: province, district, and
commune, and clam traders were interviewed in order to obtain data on government p licies and
enforcement related to intertidal land planning and allocation; government (technical and financial)
supports for clam farming; clam trader’s performance in relation to local clam farming practices and
their views on factors that govern local clam farming and marketing practices. (KIs include one person
in the Thaibinh provincial aquaculture department; two people in aquaculture sub-departments in
two districts; heads and aquacultural extensions of the three communes; and five clam traders.)
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2.2.2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
Three FGDs were conducted in the selected commune (one FGD/commune) with participation of
8–10 farmers who have good experience with clam farming and marketing practices. FGDs aimed to
explore historical events of local clam farming and market, relevant government policies and impacts
on clam farmers, as well as farmers’ coping strategies to risks and policy constraints.
2.2.3. Household Surveys
Household surveys aimed to capture in depth information on farmer’s clam farming and
marketing practices, such as farming costs and profit, risks they faced, their coping strategies, and
consequences of risks to their farming practices, as well as their lives.
Sample size of households for survey was calculated by the following equation:
n =
N × t2 × S2
N × ∆2x + t2 × S2
(1)
where n = sample size; N = total households having clam farming in the three communes (1310);
and t = confidence interval (2.17, with 97% confidence level).
Based on the first 31 households surveyed in the three communes for their clam farming loss,
sample variance (S2) of 194.88 and sample errors (∆2x) of 2.52 were estimated.
For these parameters, n = 157 was generated.
2.2.4. Data Analysis
In this study, a chronological analysis was applied to identify the impacts of government intertidal
land-use policies on clam farming practices at the farmer’s level, the trend of clam farming and
marketing practices, emergent risks, and farmer’s coping strategies and consequences. In addition,
a Mann-Whiney U-test was applied to test the impacts of different clam-raising plot sizes: those set by
the Thaibinh government and those created by farmers in clam farming.
3. Land-Use Policies and Impacts on Clam Farming
Clam farming has been practiced since the early 1990s, initially trialed by some farmers in the
Namthinh commune with a small intertidal area. Given that clam farming experience increased
and there were good market prices, more farmers started to invest in clam farming. The raising
area had been significantly expanded from 2005 to 2010, to roughly 1500 ha. For nearly 20 years
(i.e., from the early 1990s to 2010), clam farming had been spontaneously invested in and developed
by farmers through self-reclaiming of intertidal land for raising practices. In 2008–2009, when clam
farming enjoyed a lucrative benefit, conflicts between farmers who owned intertidal areas for clam
farming and others who wanted to join clam farming but had less favorable intertidal area left for them
emerged and tensions increased. To reconcile the conflict, in 2011, local governments started a policy on
intertidal land allocation that aimed to redistribute intertidal lands for clam production to more farmers
through public bidding, which was based on intertidal land-use taxes (see Table 1 for the chronology
of policies on intertidal land allocation for clam production in Thaibinh province). The Thaibinh
government started to formulate policy on intertidal land use. In 2011, intertidal land allocation was
officially implemented by Decision 1519/QD-UBND of the Thaibinh provincial government [15].
All intertidal land area was zoned and allocated to farmers who had an interest in clam farming.
Many experienced clam farmers had left their original clam farming plots for newcomers, who
accepted higher taxes. Together with an intertidal land-use policy, the Thaibinh government also
issued policies, such as Resolution 24/2011/NQ-HDND, for financial and technical support to clam
farmers [16], as well as Decision 05/2012/QD-UBND, to support juvenile clam production and clam
processing technologies [17].
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Table 1. Policies on intertidal land allocation for clam production.
Time Name and Content of Policies
2011 Decision No 1519/QD-UBND Thaibinh: 05/08/2011: “Planning for expansion clamproduction, target to reach the level of 100,000 tons/year in 2015; 200,000 tons/year in 2020”.
2012
Resolution 24/2011/NQ-HDND Thaibinh-14/12/11: “Supporting in developing clam
production” and Decision 05/2012/QD-UBND Thaibinh 18/1/2012: “Promoting juvenile
clam production and processing clam for commercial”.
Decision 11/2012/QD-UBND Thaibinh-13/7/2012: “Regulation for management clam
farming unit in intertidal area”.
Decision 21/2012/QD-UBND Thaibinh-28/12/2012: “Regulation for auction for land
renting fee, applied for land for agricultural production and business”.
2014 Decree 67/2014/ND-CP-07/07/2014: “Government promoting program for aquaculturedevelopment, containing regulation to exempt aquaculture land renting fee”.
As revealed from the Thaibinh DARD (Department of Agriculture and Rural Development)
official interviewed, within two years after Decision 1519 was implemented, there had been 2708 clam
households officially allocated with an intertidal area of 2472.4 ha in the whole province [4]
(About 1000 ha were allocated to cooperatives and companies, making a total clam farming area
of roughly 3500 ha in 2013 (Figure 1)). In addition, Resolution 24/2011/NQ-HDND and Decision
05/2012/QD-UBND provided favorable conditions for juvenile clam production and clam processing
enterprises. In 2013, there were 10 farmers invested in juvenile production, which produced about
2.3 billion juvenile clams, accounting for 17% of the total juvenile clam demand in the province.
In addition, a factory was invested for clam processing with a capacity of 15%–30% of total harvested
clams in one year in the province.
However, enforcement of Decision 1519 was relatively different between and among the
three communes, notably in terms of flexibility in land-use fees and participation of farmers which,
again, resulted in different farmers’ clam investments and resilience capacities. In the Thaido commune,
the intertidal land area was equally allocated to households with one level of fee, applied through a
random-pick approach. By contrast, in the other two communes, the intertidal land area was bid upon
among farmers, and different land-use fees applied for different intertidal land locations that more
or less favored clam farming production according to the farmers’ experiences. With low land-use
fees applied, more farmers started clam farming in the Thaido commune while a reduced number
of farmers were doing so in the other two communes. Given the increased risks in clam farming
and marketing in recent years, more farmers in the Thaido commune have been facing bankruptcy
(see Table 2).
Table 2. Enforcement of Decision 1519 in the three communes.
Items Thaido Commune (in Thaithuy District) Dongminh and Namthinh Commune(in Tienhai District)
Intertidal land
allocation approach
Every household was allocated with an
equal intertidal land area by random pick.
Land-use fee was set through auction with
farmer participation, ranging from 3 to
12 million VND (Vietnam Dong)/ha/year.
Same level of land-use fee is applied
regardless of the location of the intertidal
land area, at three million VND/ha/year.
Farmers decided to pay for intertidal area
based on their farming experience and
financial capacity
Consequences
After land reallocation, the number of
clam farms increased to nearly double,
from 63 farms to 117.
After land reallocation, the number of clam
farm slightly decreased from 600 to 510.
32% of interviewed farms had to stop
clam farming as a consequence of clam
farming bankruptcy.
17% of interviewed farms stopped clam
farming. Half of these farmers experienced
bankruptcy. The rest stopped clam farming
because of low profit.
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Given the limited intertidal land area, while more farmers wanted to join clam farming, Decision
11/2012/QD-UBND set a ceiling size for clam-raising plots of no larger than 2 ha for individual
households and 10 ha for organizations. This was invoked for the sake of equity, so all households
living along the coastal area would have the same opportunity to own one clam-raising plot.
The inflexible intertidal land allocation approach resulted in an average clam-raising plot size of
only 1.68 ha in the Thaido commune. For the more flexible land allocation approach adopted by the
other two communes, the average clam-raising plot size was much larger as compared to the Thaido
commune, up to 2.46 ha in the Dongminh and 2.90 ha in the Namthinh commune (see Table 3 [18–20]).
Table 3. Average of clam-raising plot size of the three communes.
Commune District Average of Plot Size (ha)
Dongminh Tienhai 2.46
Namthinh Tienhai 2.90
Thaido Thaithuy 1.68
In the Dongminh and Namthinh communes, farmers with the same farming interests, or those
who were relatives, decided to bid for intertidal plots adjacent to each other. This allows farmers to
group themselves and enlarge the size of their clam-raising plot. In 2011, during the land allocation
implementation, 21% of clam farmers in the Dongminh and 46% in Namthinh communes decided to
merge their intertidal areas together. Additionally, from 2013, many farmers had given up clam farming
due to serious losses in previous years. This resulted in opportunities for experienced farmers to hire
additional intertidal areas to enlarge their clam farming area. Roughly 45% of surveyed households
have hired additional land to enlarge their clam farming plot.
A Mann-Whitney U-test reveals a large impact of the clam-raising plot size on the farming
profit/cost ratio (A profit/cost ratio is a measure of profitability, calculated by dividing the net profit
by the total costs of 1 ha of clam production. The result shows how many dollars (as profit) the farmer
received when they invested $1 into this sector.) (see Table 4). The difference between these two groups
(Group 1: no larger than 2 ha; Group 2: larger than 2 ha) is caused by three factors, including (1) cost:
both variable and fixed costs are found to be inversely correlated to plot size [21]; (2) density: Group 2
applies a lower clam density, and therefore a lower mortality rate as compared to Group 1 (This can be
explained by farmers in Group 2 having a longer and better clam farming experience as compared to
Group 1 (with more new farmers joining clam production after 2011)). Lower clam-raising density
also favors the faster development of clams, which helps shorten the clam-raising cycle, which helps
reduce clam farming risks. Lastly, (3) the farming structure allows Group 2 farmers to divide their
clam farming plot into separate smaller plots (by a simple fencing system) to grow different clam
sizes, from “juvenile” to “adult” clams. This helps Group 2 farmers control juvenile clam sources
and reduces clam mortality since juvenile clams are getting used to farming conditions, as compared
to Group 1 farmers who have to purchase juvenile clams from external sources. In addition, raising
clams at different ages allows Group 2 farmers to have several harvests in a year. This not only helps
Group 2 farmers in establishing greater relationships with clam collectors, but also reduces market
risk. Additionally, farmers also revealed that the rate of clam loss caused by strong currents is also
smaller in larger clam-raising plots.
Table 4. Clam-raising plot size and farming profit/cost ratio a.
Plot Size Total Clam Plots (for All RaisingCycles, from 2006 to 2014)
Mean
(Profit/Cost Ratio) SD
Group 1: Plot size ≤ 2 ha 458 0.24 1.12
Group 2: Plot size > 2 ha 181 0.48 1.06
a The profit/cost ratio is a measure of profitability which is calculated by dividing the net profit by the total costs
of 1 ha of clam production. The result shows how much profit (in dollars) a farmer receives by investing one
dollar into this sector. The difference of the cost/profit ratio between the two groups is significant at p < 0.001.
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4. Policy Implications
As presented in previous sections, Decision 1519, together with other provincial policies, boosted
clam production in the province, reflected via heavily increased clam farming areas, as well as the
number of farmers evolving into clam farming practices since 2011. The sudden decrease in the
clam market price since 2012 has mainly been caused by a surplus of harvested clams, coupled with
increased clam farming risks caused by high clam mortality, especially in small clam-raising plots,
revealing serious limitations in the policies. By setting a ceiling limit for clam-raising plots of no larger
than 2 ha, Decision 1519 was clearly formulated without consideration of careful scientific assessment
on clam farming costs and profits, and farmers’ experiences and preferences. The infeasible approach
adopted by the Thaido communal government regarding intertidal land allocation further exaggerates
the risks for clam farmers.
It is likely that Decision 1519 aimed to provide equal opportunities to farmers who wanted to join
clam farming practices in the province by splitting intertidal areas into small plots so that all farmers
could be allocated one farming plot, even the poor. However, experienced farmers have more to
consider for their clam investment, such as farming and marketing risks, which are related to the size
and location of clam-raising plots, capital requirements, and profit that could be generated. As revealed
by farmers in FGDs, raising plot sizes to around 3 ha is the best choice in the local socioeconomic
and farming context. These findings were consistent with the research result of Dey et al. (2005),
who revealed significant inefficiencies among aquaculture farms in India, Thailand and Vietnam [22].
Decision 1519 was purely based on the provincial intertidal area that can support clam production
without a necessary assessment of possible risks, market demand, and possible coping strategies.
For instance, the Decision set a target of harvested clams for market of 100,000 tons in 2015 and
200,000 tons in 2020 [15]. However, with 71,502 and 63,604 tons of harvested clams, respectively, in
2013 and 2014, the harvest already surpassed the existing clam market demands and strongly reflected
a reduced clam market price in these years. Additionally, promoting clam farming production and
little on clam processing, the provincial government did not make any assessment on clam market
demands, as well as the efforts needed for the required market promotion. This creates a serious
disjuncture between clam production and market demand, as observed in recent years. A lack of market
information, trapped by small raising plot sizes set by policy, and a shortage of clam farming skill have
brought many farmers, including the poor, into financial loss, even bankruptcy. Public encouragement
may have led to a surfeit of production when the market fell. In short, there may not be anything
wrong in economic terms with the government seeking both to encourage clam aquaculture and to
balance efficiency and equity claims. In so doing, though, the government might have done it more
effectively, rather than doing nothing at all.
Without farmers’ participation, provincial policies were constrained into physical intertidal land
allocation, loans, and some technical provisions (in the form of extensions). Since clam farming requires
a large initial financial investment, it embeds itself with high risks. Moreover, different from inland
aquaculture, clam farming is totally exposed to the (open) ocean environment with little control of
farmers over their farming practices (Even existing net fencing does not totally control clam loss under
high sea current increases). This creates additional risks for clam farmers. However, no warnings have
been provided by the Thaibinh government to farmers before policies on intertidal land allocation
were made, letting new and even poor farmers engage in such risky farming practices.
The government can devise ways to help farmers with its policy choices. The top-down policy
formulation and enforcement have been creating trouble for farmers, instead of helping them gain
better incomes and livelihoods. Many similar lessons were learned from other developing countries
regarding their aquacultural policies and consequences on farmers’ welfare, such as Bangladesh [23–25],
Thailand [26], the Philippines [27], and some countries in Africa [28]. Decentralized policy-making
with farmers’ participation is needed to make the government policy successful in supporting farmers.
As revealed in this study, even the same provincial policies, but with different enforcement, have
resulted in different farming outcomes for clam farmers in the three study communes. A more feasible
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intertidal land allocation taken by the Dongminh and Namthinh governments allowed farmers with
similar interests to create a group and develop clam-raising plots that help them reduce their farming
risks, while this is not happening in the Thaido commune.
More decentralized policy-making and enforcement will allow government aquacultural planning
and policies to be more responsible to different stakeholders. In other words, policy formulation needs
to be of a demand-driven approach [29,30]. This requires a vast amount of background information,
ranging from opinions and verbalized needs from primary stakeholders (e.g., aquatic farmers in
communities) to quantitative data on demand from various (multi) stakeholders [30].
For nearly 20 years of the farmers’ own investments, clam farming areas were expanded to
about 1500 ha in 2010. However, nearly 2000 ha of intertidal area was brought into clam farming
within three years, from 2011–2013, after the Thaibinh government officially institutionalized intertidal
land-use and clam farming supporting policies. Government policies have created shocks in a different
direction: increases in clam farming area and juvenile clam price, and reductions in the clam market
price. All clam farmers have been hit by these shocks, though to different extents.
Promoting clam production without carefully and systematically assessing the cost-benefit, market
demands, possible risks, and controlling measures, as well as other supports for market research and
development, processing technologies, food safety control strategies, etc., has contributed to crises
in clam farming in the following years. For instance, nearly 1000 ha of clam production area was
added between 2011 and 2014, while the market demand for clams suddenly decreased in 2012.
Despite increasing the production area, revenues started decreasing afterwards, trapping the poorest
and less experienced farmers. This has happened mainly because of a governmental policy that
incentivizes land use for clam production but which did not take into account the market effects.
Governmental policy seems to be the main reason explaining the loss in profitability, which may be
equally important to the loss of international clam markets (i.e., China and the EU) which led to an
oversupply in the domestic market. The change in profitability could result from changes in prices
and cost increases.
5. Conclusions
Increased market demand, coupled with exhausted natural clam resources, initiated clam farming
in intertidal areas of the Thaibinh province in the early 1990s. The clam farming area was gradually
increasing in the following 20 years, powered by high clam market prices, increased clam farming
experience, and farmers’ capital accumulation to reinvest in clam farming. In this period, small clam
farming areas provided farmers with significant advantages from natural resources that support clam
growth, and access to large market demands. However, these advantages have been eroded since
2011 when the Thaibinh government’s policies on intertidal land allocation and technical and financial
supports were brought into effect.
Nearly 20 years of farmers’ spontaneous investment in clam farming expanded clam-raising areas
by up to 1500 ha. However, just three years after the provincial policies targeted toward boosting clam
farming came into effect, nearly 2000 ha of new intertidal land was claimed for clam farming, with
many new farmers who are not acquainted with clam farming joining the sector. The sudden and
significant increase in the clam farming area has imposed massive consequences on farming practices,
as well as on farmers’ lives.
The increased clam farming area with a higher farming density has caused increased clam farming
risks, i.e., a higher mortality rate. These, together, led to higher juvenile clam demand and, thus,
the price increased. This exaggerated farming investment creates risks for clam farmers. In parallel,
the increased farming area has produced a surplus of harvested clams, which was significantly over
market demand; consequently, the clam market price was reduced. This brought chaos to the clam
farming sector and to farmers in the Thaibinh province, shortly after policies related to clam farming
development took effect.
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An important lesson to be learned from this study is that governments (from the local to the
national level) play important roles in directing farmers in clam farming practices. Ironically, the initial
good intentions of the government to increase clam farming areas and to provide opportunities for
more farmers in the sector have resulted in a reverse impact, which has posed lethal risks to the sector
and to farmers.
The study results confirm that top-down policy formulation and enforcement has, thus, been
creating trouble for farmers, instead of helping them to gain better income from clam farming. Even at
farmer’s level, the same provincial intertidal land-use policies but with different enforcement, have
resulted in different farming outcomes for clam farmers in the three study communes. Intertidal land
allocation without consideration of farmers’ preferences and farming capacity taken by the Thaido
government has created more trouble for the farmers as compared to the other two communes where
farmers had more of a voice and choices in bidding for the intertidal area they preferred. It is thus likely
that if greater scientific assessment, for instance with respect to the profit/cost ratio of clam farming
practices, on clam market demand as well as on farmers’ participation was taken into consideration
for policy-making and enforcement, the risks to clam farming and marketing would have been smaller,
and possible risk warnings could have been provided to farmers to make them better aware of and
able to control, risks both in farming and marketing practices.
However, the participation of farmers will certainly cause more complications and costs for
policy-making and enforcement. This implies that future studies should focus on this subject to
identify not only a suitable approach to get more farmers involved, but also a trade-off between more
farmer participation and the relevant costs embedded in effective policy-making and enforcement.
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